Meditat. III.Of GOD, and that there is a God.

Now will I shut my eyes, I will stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses, I will blot out the Images of corporeal things clearly from my mind, or (because that can scarce be accomplish’d) I will give no heed to them, as being vain and false, and by discoursing with my self, and prying more rightly into my own Nature, will endeavour to make my self by degrees more known and familiar to my self.

I am a Thinking Thing, that is to say, doubting, affirming, denying, understanding few things, ignorant of many things, willing, nilling, imagining also, and sensitive. For (as before I have noted) though perhaps whatever I imagine, or am sensible of, as without me, Is not; yet that manner of thinking which I call sense and imagination (as they are only certain Modes of Thinking) I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have mention’d whatever I know, or at least Whatever as yet I perceive my self to know.

Now will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some other Thing in Me, of Which I have not yet taken Notice. I am sure That I am a Thinking Thing, and therefore Do not I know what is Required to make certain of any Thing? I Answer, that in this My first knowledge ’tis Nothing but a clear, and distinct perception of What I affirm, Which would not be sufficient to make me certain of the Truth of a Thing, if it were Possible that any thing that I so clearly and distinctly Perceive should be false. Wherefore I may lay this Down as a Principle.

But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very Certain and manifest, Which I afterwards found to be doubtful. Therefore What sort of Things were they? Viz. Heaven, Earth, Stars, and all other things which I perceived by my Senses. But What did I Perceive of These Clearly? Viz.

But When I was exercised about any single and easie Proposition in Arithmetick or Geometry, as that two and three added make five, Did not I Perceive them Clearly enough to make me affirm them True? Truly concerning these I had no other Reason afterwards to Doubt, but That I thought Perhaps there may be a God who might have so created me, that I should be Deceived even in those things which seem’d most Clear to me. And as often as this Pre-conceived opinion of Gods great Power comes into my Mind, I cannot but Confess that he may easily cause me to Err even in those things which I Think I perceive most Evidently with my Mind; yet as often as I Consider the Things themselves, which I Judge my self to perceive so Clearly, I am so fully Perswaded by them, that I easily Break out into these Expressions, Let Who can Deceive Me, yet he shall never Cause me Not to Be whilst I think that I Am, or that it shall ever be True, that I never was, Whilst at Present ’tis True that I am, or Perhaps, that Two and Three added make More or Less then Five; for in These things I Percieve a Manifest Repugnancy; And truely seeing I have no reason to Think any God a Deceiver, Nor as yet fully know Whether there Be any God, or Not, ’Tis but a slight and (as I may say) Metaphysical Reason of Doubt, which depends only on that opinion of which I am not yet Perswaded.

Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought to Enquire, Whether there Be a God, And if there be One, Whether he can be a Deceiver, For whilst I am Ignorant of this, I cannot possibly be fully Certain of any Other thing.

But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain Heads, and to search in Which of them Truth or Falshood properly Consists. Some of them are (as it were) the Images of Things, and to these alone the Name of an Idea properly belongs, as When I think upon a Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or God. But there are others of them, that have superadded Forms to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever I think) some certain Thing as the subject or object of my Thought, but in this last sort of thoughts there is something more which I Think upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and Others of them Judgments.

Now as touching Ideas, if they be Consider’d alone as they are in themselves, without Respect to any other Things, they cannot Properly be false; for Whether I Imagine a Goat or a Chimera, ’tis as Certain that I Imagine one as t’other. Also in the Will and Affections I need not Fear any Falshood, For tho I should Wish for evil Things, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore Not true that I Wish for them.

Wherefore there onely Remains my Judgments of Things, in which I must take Care that I be not deceived. Now the Chief and most usual Error that I discover in them is, That I Judge Those Ideas that are within me to be Conformable and like to certain things that are without Me; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certain Modes of my Thought, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford me an Occasion of Erring.

Of these Ideas some are Innate, some Adventitious, and some Others seem to Me as Created by my self; For that I understand what A Thing Is, What is Truth, What a Thought, seems to Proceed meerly from my own Nature. But that I now hear a Noise, see the Sun, or feel heat, I have alwayes Judged to Proceed from Things External. But Lastly, Mermaids, Griffins, and such like Monsters, are made meerly by My self. And yet I may well think all of them either Adventitious, or all of them Innate, or all of them made by my self, for I have not as yet discover’d their true Original.

But I ought cheifly to search after those of them which I count Adventitious, and which I consider as coming from outward objects, that I may know what reason I have to think them like the things themselves, which they represent. Viz. Nature so teaches Me; and also I know that they depend not on my Will, and therefore not on me; for they are often present with me against my inclinations, or (as they say) in spite of my teeth, as now whether I will or no I feel heat, and therefore I think that the sense or Idea of heat is propagated to me by a thing really distinct from my self, and that is by the heat of the Fire at which I sit; And nothing is more obvious then for me to judge that That thing should transmit its own Likeness into me, rather then that any other thing should be transmitted by it.

When I here say, that nature so teaches me, I understand only, that I am as it were willingly forced to beleive it, and not that ’tis discover’d to me to be true by any natural light; for these two differ very much. For whatever is discover’d to me by the Light of nature (as that it necessarily Follows that I am, because I think) cannot possibly be doubted; Because I am endowed with no other Faculty, in which I may put so great confidence, as I can in the Light of nature; or which can possibly tell me, that those things are false, which natural light teaches me to be true; and as to my natural Inclinations, I have heretofore often judged my self led by them to the election of the worst part, when I was in the choosing one of two Goods; and therefore I see no reason why I should ever trust them in any other thing.

And then, tho these Ideas depend not on my will, it does not therefore follow that they necessarily proceed from things external. For as, Altho those Inclinations (which I but now mention’d) are in me, yet they seem distinct and different from my will; so perhaps there may be in me some other faculty (to me unknown) which may prove the Efficient cause of these Ideas, as hitherto I have observed them to be formed in me whilst I dream, without the help of any External Object.

And last of all, tho they should proceed from things which are different from me, it does not therefore follow that they must be like those things. For often times I have found the thing and the Idea differing much. As for example, I find in my self two divers Ideas of the Sun, one as received by my senses (and which cheifly I reckon among those I call adventitious) by which it appears to me very smal, * another as taken from the arguments of Astronomers (that is to say, consequentially collected, or some other ways made by me from certain natural notions) by which ’tis rendred something bigger then the Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of these cannot be like that sun which is without me, and my reason perswades me, that that Idea is most unlike the Sun, which seems to proceed Immediately from it self.

All which things sufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from a true judgement, but from a blind impulse) beleived that there are certain things different from my self, and which have sent their Ideas or Images into me by the Organs of my senses, or some other way.

But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things (whose Ideas I have within Me) are Really Existent without Me; And that is Thus: As those Ideas are only Modes of Thinking, I acknowledge no Inequality between them, and they all proceed from me in the same Manner. But as one Represents one thing, an other, an other Thing, ’tis Evident there is a Great difference between them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent Substances are something More, or (as I may say) have More of Objective Reallity in them, then those that Represent only Modes or Accidents; and again, That by Which I understand a Mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent Creatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more Objective Reallity, then Those Ideas by which Finite Substances are Exhibited.

But Now, it is evident by the Light of Nature that there must be as much at least in the Total efficient Cause, as there is in the Effect of that Cause; For from Whence can the effect have its Reallity, but from the Cause? and how can the Cause give it that Reallity, unless it self have it?

And from hence it follows, that neither a Thing can be made out of Nothing, Neither a Thing which is more Perfect (that is, Which has in it self more Reallity) proceed from That Which is Less Perfect.

And this is Clearly True, not only in those Effects whose Actual or Formal Reallity is Consider’d, But in Those Ideas also, Whose Objective Reallity is only Respected; That is to say, for Example of Illustration, it is not only impossible that a stone, Which was not, should now begin to Be, unless it were produced by something, in Which, Whatever goes to the Making a Stone, is either Formally or Virtually; neither can heat be Produced in any Thing, which before was not hot, but by a Thing which is at least of as equal a degree of Perfection as heat is; But also ’tis Impossible that I should have an Idea of Heat, or of a Stone, unless it were put into me by some Cause, in which there is at Least as much Reallity, as I Conceive there is in heat or a Stone. For tho that Cause transfers none of its own Actual or Formal Reality into my Idea, I must not from thence conclude that ’tis less real; but I may think that the nature of the Idea it self is such, that of it self it requires no other formal reality, but what it has from my thought, of which ’tis a mode. But that this Idea has this or that objective reallity, rather then any other, proceeds clearly from some cause, in which there ought to be at least as much formal reallity, as there is of objective reallity in the Idea it self. For if we suppose any thing in the Idea, which was not in its cause, it must of necessity have this from nothing; but (tho it be a most Imperfect manner of existing, by which the thing is objectively in the Intellect by an Idea, yet) it is not altogether nothing, and therefore cannot proceed from nothing.

Neither ought I to doubt, seeing the reallity which I perceive in my Ideas is only an objective reallity, that therefore it must of necessity follow, that the same reallity should be in the causes of these Ideas formally. But I may conclude, that ’tis sufficient that this reallity be in the very causes only objectively. For as that objective manner of being appertains to the very nature of an Idea, so that formal manner of being appertains to the very nature of a cause of Ideas, at least to the first and chiefest causes of them; For tho perhaps one Idea may receive its birth from an other, yet we cannot proceed in Infinitum, but at last we must arrive at some first Idea, whose cause is (as it were) an Original copy, in which all the objective reallity of the Idea is formally contain’d. So that I plainly discover by the light of nature, that the Ideas, which are in me, are (as it were) Pictures, which may easily come short of the perfection of those things from whence they are taken, but cannot contain any thing greater or more perfect then them: And the longer and more diligently I pry into these things, so much the more clearly and distinctly do I discover them to be true.

But what shall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if the objective reallity of any of my Ideas be such, that it cannot be in me either formally or eminently, and that therefore I cannot be the cause of that Idea, from hence it necessarily Follows, that I alone do not only exist, but that some other thing, which is cause of that Idea, does exist also.

But if I can find no such Idea in me, I have no argument to perswade me of the existence of any thing besides my self for I have diligently enquired, and hitherto I could discover no other perswasive.

Some of these Ideas there are (besides that which represents my self to my self, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which represent to me, one of them a God, others of them Corporeal and Inanimate things, some of them Angels, others Animals, and lastly some of them which exhibite to me men like my self.

As touching those that represent Men or Angels or Animals, I easily understand that they may be made up of those Ideas which I have of my self, of Corporeal things, and of God, tho there were neither man (but my self) nor Angel, nor Animal in being.

And as to the Ideas of Corporeal things, I find nothing in them of that perfection, but it may proceed from my self; for if I look into them more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yesterday (in the second Medit.) I did the Idea of Wax, I find there are but few things which I perceive clearly and distinctly in them, viz. Magnitude or extension in Longitude, Latitude, and Profundity, the Figure or shape which arises from the termination of that Extension, the Position or place which divers Figured Bodies have in respect of each other, their motion or change of place; to which may be added, their substance, continuance, and number; as to the other, such as are, Light, Colours, Sounds, Smels, Tasts, Heat, and Cold, with the other tactile qualities, I have but very obscure and confused thoughts of them, so that I know not, whether they are true or false, that is to say, whether the Ideas I have of them are the Ideas of things which really are, or are not. For altho falshood formally and properly so called, consists only in the judgement (as before I have observed) yet there is an other sort of material falshood in Ideas, when they represent a thing as really existent, tho it does not exist; so, for example, the Ideas I have of heat and cold are so obscure and confused, that I cannot collect from them, whether cold be a privation of heat, or heat a privation of cold, or whether either of them be a real quality, or whether neither of them be real. And since every Idea must be like the thing it represents, if it be true that cold is nothing but the privation of heat, that Idea which represents it to me as a thing real and positive may deservedly be called false.

And now I see no necessity why I should assigne any other Author of these Ideas but my self; for if they are false, that is, represent things that are not, I know by the light of nature that they proceed from nothing; that is to say, I harbour them upon no other account, but because my nature is deficient in something, and imperfect. But if they are true, yet seeing I discover so little reality in them, that that very reality scarce seems to be realy, I see no reason why I my self should not be the Author of them.

But also some of those very Ideas of Corporeal things which are clear and distinct, I may seem to have borrow’d from the Idea I have of my self, viz. Substance, duration, number, and the like; For when I conceive a stone to be a substance (that is, a thing apt of it self to exist) and also that I my self am a substance, tho I conceive my self a thinking substance and not extended, and the stone an extended substance and not thinking, by which there is a great diversity between both the conceptions, yet they agree in this, that they are both substances.

As to those other things, of which the Idea of a body is made up, as extension, figure, place and motion, they are not formally in me, seeing I am only a thinking thing; yet seeing they are only certain modes of substance, and I my self also am a substance, they may seem to be in me eminently.

* Wherefore there only Remains the Idea of a God, wherein I must consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly have its original from me. By the word God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self, and every thing else that is (if any thing do Actualy exist) was created. All which Attributes are of such an high nature, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive my self possible to be the Author of these notions.

From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a God; for tho the Idea of substance may arise in me, because that I my self am a substance, yet I could not have the Idea of an Infinite substance (seeing I my self am finite) unless it proceeded from a substance which is really Infinite. Neither ought I to think that I have no true Idea of Infinity, or that I perceive it only by the negation of what is finite, as I conceive rest and darkness by the negation or absence of motion or light. But on the contrary I plainly understand, that there is more reality in an Infinite substance, then in a Finite; and that therefore the perception of an Infinite (as God) is antecedent to the notion I have of a finite (as my self). For how should I know that I doubt or desire, that is to say, that I want something, and that I am not altogether perfect, unless I had the Idea of a being more perfect then my self, by comparing my self to which I may discover my own Imperfections.

Neither can it be said that this Idea of God is false Materialiter, and that therefore it proceeds from nothing, as before I observed of the Ideas of heat and cold, &c. For on the contrary, seeing this notion is most clear and distinct, and contains in it self more objective reality then any other Idea, none can be more true in it self, nor in which less suspition of falshood can be found. This Idea (I say) of a being infinitely perfect is most true, for tho it may be supposed that such a being does not exist, yet it cannot be supposed that the Idea of such a being exhibites to me nothing real, as before I have said of the Idea of cold.

Neither can it be objected, that I cannot comprehend an Infinite, or that there are innumerable other things in God, which I can neither conceive, nor in the least think upon; for it is of the very nature of an Infinite not to be apprehendable by me who am finite. And ’tis sufficient to me to prove this my Idea of God to be the most true, the most clear, and the most distinct Idea of all those Ideas I have, upon this account, that I understand that God is not to be understood, and that I judge that whatever I clearly perceive and know Implys any perfection, as also perhaps other innumerable perfections, which I am ignorant of, are in God either formally or eminently.

Doubt. But perhaps I am something more then I take my self to be, and perhaps all these perfections which I attribute to God, are potentially in me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and break into action.

Solution. But none of these will do; for first, tho it be true that my Knowledge is capable of being increased, and that many things are in me potentially, which actually are not, yet none of these go to the making an Idea of God, in which I conceive nothing potentially, for tis a certain argument of imperfection that a thing may be encreased Gradually. Moreover, tho my knowledge may be more and more encreased, yet I know that it can never be actually Infinite, for it can never arrive to that height of perfection, which admits not of an higher degree. But I conceive God to be actually so Infinite, that nothing can be added to his perfections.

Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not evident by the light of reason to any one that will diligently consider them. Yet because that (when I am careless, and the Images of sensible things blind my understanding) I do not so easily call to mind the reasons, why the Idea of a being more perfect then my self should of necessity proceed from a being which is really more perfect; It will be requisite to enquire further, whether I, who have this Idea, can possibly be, unless such a being did exist. To which end let me aske, from whence should I be? From my self? or from my Parents? or from any other thing less perfect then God? for nothing can be thought or supposed more perfect, or equally perfect with God.

But first, If I were from my self, I should neither doubt, nor desire, nor want any thing, for I should have given my self all those perfections, of which I have any Idea, and consequently I my self should be God; and I cannot think that those things I want, are to be acquired with greater difficulty then those things I have; but on the contrary, ’tis manifest, that it were much more difficult that I (that is, a substance that thinks) should arise out of nothing, then that I should acquire the knowledge of many things whereof I am Ignorant, which is only the accident of that substance. And certainly if I had that greater thing (viz being) from my self, I should not have denyed my self (not only, those things which may be easier acquired, but also) All those things, which I perceived are contain’d in the Idea of a God; and the reason is, for that no other things seem to me to be more difficultly done, and certainly if they were Really more difficult, they would seem more difficult to me (if whatever I have, I have from my self) for in those things I should find my Power put to a stop.

Neither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing my self to have alwaies Been, what now I am, and that therefore I need not seek for an Author of my Being. For the Duration or Continuance of my life may be divided into Innumerable Parts, each of which does not at all depend on the Other Parts; Therefore it will not follow, that because a while ago, I was, I must of necessity now Be. I say, this will not follow, Unless, I suppose some Cause to Create me (as it were) anew for this Moment (that is, Conserve me). For ’tis evident to one that Considers the Nature of Duration, that the same Power and Action is requisite to the Conservation of a Thing each Moment of its Being, as there is to the Creation of that Thing anew, if it did not exist. So that ’tis one of those Principles which are Evident by the Light of Nature: that the Act of Conservation differs only Ratione (as the Philosophers term it) from the Act of Creation.

Wherefore I ought to ask my self this Question, whether I, who now Am; have any Power to Cause my self to Be hereafter? (for had I any such power, I should certainly know of it, seeing I am nothing but a Thinking Thing, or at least at present I onely treat of that part of me, which is a Thing that Thinks) to which, I answer, that I can discover no such Power in Me; And consequently, I evidently know that I depend on some Other being distinct from my self.

But what if I say that perhaps this Being is not God, but that I am produced either by my Parents, or some other Causes less perfect then God? In answer to which let me consider (as I have said before) that ’tis manifest that whatever is in the effect, so much at least ought to be in the cause; and therefore seeing I am a thing that thinks, and have in me an Idea of God, it will confessedly follow, that whatever sort of cause I assign of my own Being, it also must be a Thinking Thing, and must have an Idea of all those Perfections, which I attribute to God; Of which Cause it may be again Asked, whether it be from it self, or from any other Cause? If from it self, ’tis evident (from what has been said) that it must be God; For seeing it has the Power of Existing of it self, without doubt it has also the power of actually Possessing all those Perfections whereof it has an Idea in it self, that is, all those Perfections which I conceive in God. But if it Be from an other Cause, it may again be asked of that Cause whether it be of it self, or from an other; Till at length We arrive at the Last Cause of All, Which will Be God. For ’tis evident, that this Enquiry will not admit of Progressus in Infinitum, especially when at Present I treat not only of that Cause which at first made Me; But chiefly of that which conserves me in this Instant time.

Neither can it be supposed that many partial Causes have concurred to the making Me, and that I received the Idea of one of Gods perfections from One of them, and from an other of them the Idea of an other; and that therefore all these Perfections are to be found scattered in the World, but not all of them Joyn’d in any one which may Be God. For on the contrary, Unity, Simplicity, or the inseparability of All Gods Attributes is one of the chief Perfections which I conceive in Him; and certainly the Idea of the Unity of the Divine Perfections could not be created in me by any other cause, then by That, from whence I have received the Ideas of his other perfections; For ’tis Impossible to make me conceive these perfections, conjunct and inseparable, unless he should also make me know what perfections these are.

Lastly as touching my having my Being from my Parents. Tho whatever Thoughts I have heretofore harbour’d of Them were True, yet certainly they contribute nothing to my conservation, neither proceed I from them as I am a Thing that Thinks, for they have onely predisposed that material Thing, wherein I, that is, my mind (which only at present I take for my self) Inhabits. Wherefore I cannot now Question that I am sprung from them. But I must of necessity conclude that because I am, and because I have an Idea of a Being most perfect, that is, of God, it evidently follows that there is a God.

* Now it only remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of God. For I have neither received it by means of my Senses, neither comes it to me without my Forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to do, when such things Work on the Organs of my Sense, or at least seem so to work; Neither is this Idea framed by my self, for I can neither detract from, nor add any thing thereto. Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is Innate, even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self.

And truly ’tis not to be Admired that God in Creating me should Imprint this Idea in me, that it may there remain as a stamp impressed by the Workman God on me his Work, neither is it requisite that this stamp should be a Thing different from the Work it self, but ’tis very Credible (from hence only that God Created me) that I am made as it were according to his likeness and Image, and that the same likeness, in which the Idea of God is contain’d, is perceived by Me with the same faculty, with which I perceive my Self; That is to say, whilst I reflect upon my self, I do not only perceive that I am an Imperfect thing, having my dependance upon some other thing, and that I am a Thing that Desires more and better things Indefinitely; But also at the same time I understand, that He on whom I depend contains in him all those wish’d for things (not only Indefinitely and Potentially, but) Really, Indefinitely; and that therefore he is God. The whole stress of which * Argument lies thus, because I know it Impossible for Me to Be of the same Nature I am, Viz.

By which ’tis evident that God is no Deceiver; for ’tis manifest by the Light of Nature, that all fraud and deceit depends on some defect. But before I prosecute this any farther, or pry into other Truthes which may be deduced from this, I am willing here to stop, and dwell upon the Contemplation of this God, to Consider with my self His Divine Attributes, to behold, admire, and adore the Loveliness of this Immense light, as much as possibly I am able to accomplish with my dark Understanding. For as by Faith we believe that the greatest happiness of the next Life consists alone in the Contemplation of the Divine Majesty, so we find by Experience that now we receive from thence the greatest pleasure, whereof we are capable in this Life; Tho it be much more Imperfect then that in the Next.